What are the key sales KPIs for the Luxury Fashion House industry in 2027?

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Direct Answer

The nine KPIs that actually run a luxury fashion house in 2027 are: Organic Revenue Growth %, Gross Margin %, EBIT (Recurring Operating) Margin %, Retail (DOS) Sales Share %, Wholesale Dependency %, Regional Mix (Greater China / Europe / Americas / Japan / RoW), Leather Goods Share of Revenue %, Price-Increase Capture %, and Top-Client (VIC) Revenue Concentration %.

Together they answer the only three questions a luxury CFO and creative director actually fight about: are we still growing without discounting, are we controlling our distribution, and are we still desirable to the few thousand clients who write seven-figure checks.

TL;DR
— Luxury is a brand-equity business disguised as a fashion business. Organic growth below 3% means desirability is leaking; gross margin under 65% means the pricing power is gone; retail share under 70% means wholesale is dictating your image. Track the nine KPIs monthly, re-baseline the Greater China and VIC numbers every quarter, and run a price-increase capture review twice a year — that is the operating cadence LVMH, Hermès, and Richemont all converged on after the 2024-2025 normalization.

Why Luxury Fashion Houses Work Differently

A luxury fashion house is not a retailer with a logo, even though it looks like one from the outside. Four mechanics make it its own category.

Desirability-funds-pricing flywheel. Every percentage point of brand desirability translates into roughly 50-150 basis points of pricing power per year. Hermès has compounded prices at ~7% annually for a decade and still has Birkin waitlists. Burberry and Gucci tried the same playbook during the 2021-2023 boom, lost the underlying desirability, and watched their organic growth turn negative in 2024-2025.

The flywheel only spins one direction at a time.

Quota-and-allocation economics. Unlike apparel, the highest-margin luxury units are not sold on demand — they are allocated. A client buying a Birkin, a Cartier high jewelry piece, or a Patek Philippe Nautilus is selected. This makes the top-client revenue share a leading indicator of brand health.

When the top 2% of clients drop from 40% to 30% of revenue, it almost always precedes a public deceleration by two quarters.

Wholesale-is-distribution-is-image. Every department store door and multi-brand boutique is a brand-equity decision, not a sales channel. LVMH Fashion & Leather Goods runs near 95% retail (direct-operated stores). Hermès is ~88%.

Kering pushed Gucci toward 92% retail by closing 30%+ of wholesale doors in 2024-2025. The pattern is universal — the houses with the highest pricing power are the ones who own their distribution.

Regional concentration as both engine and risk. Greater China generated ~28-32% of personal luxury spend in 2024 before correcting to ~25% in 2025. A house with 40%+ China exposure (Burberry historically, Prada, Richemont jewelry) lives and dies on the Chinese consumer cycle. The houses that survived the 2024-2025 correction were the ones who had quietly rebalanced toward US and Japanese demand.

The 9 KPIs, In Depth

1. Organic Revenue Growth % (constant FX, like-for-like perimeter). The cleanest top-line metric in luxury. Hermès posted +13% organic growth in 2024 and another high-single-digit number in 2025.

LVMH Fashion & Leather Goods went from +14% in 2023 to -1% organic in 2025. Kering reported -10% organic in 2025. Bain projects 3-5% market growth in 2026.

Anything sustainably above mid-single-digits in 2026-2027 means you are taking share.

2. Gross Margin %. The pricing-power metric. Hermès runs ~72% gross margin.

LVMH Fashion & Leather Goods is ~68-70%. Kering ~73% headline (but inflated by mix). Healthy luxury is 65%+; under 60% means you are either overpaying for raw materials or under-pricing your product.

Watch the year-over-year delta — a 200bps gross margin compression with flat revenue is almost always a markdown problem hiding in the cost line.

3. EBIT (Recurring Operating) Margin %. Hermès is the benchmark at ~40-41% — the highest in the industry. LVMH Fashion & Leather Goods historically ~35-39%, compressed to ~32% in 2025.

Kering collapsed from ~28% in 2022 to mid-teens in 2025 as Gucci unwound. Brunello Cucinelli runs ~16-17%. Below 20% for a luxury house signals either creative reset costs or structural deleverage.

4. Retail (DOS) Sales Share %. Share of sales through directly operated stores plus owned e-commerce. LVMH Fashion & Leather Goods ~95%, Hermès ~88%, Prada Group ~91%, Burberry ~85%, Moncler ~85%, Brunello Cucinelli ~57% (the outlier that still leans on multi-brand).

Best-in-class is 85%+. Every 500bps of retail share gain typically adds 150-200bps of group EBIT margin.

5. Wholesale Dependency %. The mirror of KPI 4 and a separate KPI because it captures the concentration risk inside wholesale — share of wholesale done with the top 5 department-store accounts (Nordstrom, Saks, Bergdorf, Harrods, Galeries Lafayette, El Corte Inglés, Isetan).

If your top-5 wholesale customers are over 60% of wholesale revenue, a single account renegotiation moves your P&L.

6. Regional Mix (Greater China / Europe / Americas / Japan / Rest of World). Reported quarterly by every public house. The benchmark mix in 2026: ~30% Asia ex-Japan (of which 20-25 points is Greater China), ~25-28% Europe, ~25% Americas, ~7-9% Japan, balance RoW.

Anything over 35% Greater China is concentration risk; under 15% means you are missing the rebound. Japan has structurally re-rated upward post-yen weakness — Hermès and LVMH both saw Japan move from ~7% to ~9-10% of group revenue.

7. Leather Goods Share of Revenue %. Leather goods carry the highest gross margins in fashion (often 75%+) and the lowest fashion risk. Louis Vuitton leather is estimated at 70%+ of brand revenue.

Hermès leather goods & saddlery is ~43% of group. Gucci leather goods historically ~55%. A drift below 40% in a fashion-leather house typically means the ready-to-wear and shoes mix is bloating cost of goods.

8. Price-Increase Capture %. Of headline price increases pushed at the start of the season, the percentage that actually shows up in average selling price (ASP) by quarter-end. Hermès captures ~95%+ of announced price increases.

LVMH historically ~85-90%. Gucci's capture rate collapsed to under 50% in 2024-2025 as discounting and outlet leakage eroded the headline number. Capture below 70% is the first quantitative sign that the brand has lost pricing power.

9. Top-Client (VIC) Revenue Concentration %. Share of revenue from the top 2% of clients (the "Very Important Clients"). Bain estimates "big spenders" went from 30% of the personal luxury market (€88B) in 2019 to 45-47% (~€165B) in 2024-2025 and have plateaued.

House-specific data shows Hermès, Cartier, and Louis Vuitton run 35-45% top-2% concentration; Bottega Veneta and Saint Laurent ~25-30%; mass-luxury houses (Tapestry, Capri) under 15%. A drop of 500bps in top-client share is a 6-month leading indicator of revenue deceleration.

flowchart TD A[Brand Desirability Score] --> B{Pricing Power Intact?} B -->|Yes 95%+ Capture| C[Price Increase Takes Hold] B -->|No <70% Capture| D[Markdown + Outlet Leakage] C --> E[Gross Margin Expansion] D --> F[Gross Margin Compression] E --> G[Reinvest in Retail DOS Network] G --> H[Retail Share Climbs to 90%+] H --> I[VIC Allocation & Service Lifts] I --> J[Top-Client Share 40%+] J --> A F --> K[Wholesale Push to Move Inventory] K --> L[Image Dilution + VIC Defection] L --> M[Revenue Decel by Q+2] M --> A

Real Operators

LVMH is the scale benchmark — €80.8B in 2025 revenue across 75 maisons, with Louis Vuitton and Dior the cash engines. Hermès is the profitability benchmark — €15.2B revenue with ~40% recurring operating margin and the highest gross margin in the industry. Kering (Gucci, Saint Laurent, Bottega Veneta, Balenciaga) is the cautionary tale of 2024-2025, posting -10% organic with Gucci in creative reset.

Richemont (Cartier, Van Cleef & Arpels, Vacheron Constantin, Piaget) is the hard-luxury benchmark with jewelry maisons running ~30%+ EBIT margins. Prada Group (Prada, Miu Miu, Church's) became the unlikely momentum story — Miu Miu posted +90%+ organic growth in 2024 and high-double-digits in 2025.

Chanel is private but disclosed $19.7B in 2023 revenue, the largest single-brand luxury house. Burberry is rebuilding after the Daniel Lee reset. Moncler runs ~28-30% EBIT margins on premium outerwear.

Brunello Cucinelli is the slow-compounder — mid-teens organic growth, ~17% EBIT margin, the "quiet luxury" archetype. Tapestry (Coach, Kate Spade, Stuart Weitzman) is the accessible-luxury comp at ~$6.7B revenue. Capri Holdings (Versace, Jimmy Choo, Michael Kors) is the deal-saga, post the blocked Tapestry merger.

Failure Modes

The four that quietly kill luxury houses. (1) Wholesale-funded growth — using department store and outlet expansion to hit short-term revenue targets, which dilutes brand equity and forces price compression within 18-24 months. (2) Creative-director musical chairs — replacing the head designer every 24-30 months destroys the visual codes clients pay for, and Gucci, Burberry, and Balmain all show the revenue scar tissue.

(3) Greater China over-indexing — building a P&L that needs 35%+ China to make plan, then watching the consumer cycle take 600-1000bps off organic growth in a single quarter. (4) VIC neglect — under-investing in private salons, by-appointment events, and one-to-one client advisors, then watching top-2% client share decay 300-500bps a year while the brand quietly hollows out.

Reporting Cadence

Daily: retail traffic, conversion, and DOS sell-through by region and category. Weekly: like-for-like growth, top-15 SKU sell-through, VIC appointments booked, e-commerce gross merchandise value. Monthly: organic growth by region, gross margin by category, retail vs wholesale mix, price-increase capture by season, top-client revenue concentration.

Quarterly: full IFRS P&L, regional segment reporting for the half-year or annual call, brand-equity tracker results (BAV, Interbrand, Vogue Business Index), and re-baseline of the 12-month organic growth forecast.

flowchart TD A[Daily Retail Telemetry] --> B[Traffic + Conversion + DOS Sell-Through] B --> C[Weekly Brand Review] C --> D[LFL Growth + VIC Appts + Top-15 SKU] D --> E[Monthly Operating Review] E --> F[Organic by Region + GM by Category + Price Capture] F --> G[Quarterly Earnings + Board] G --> H[Full P&L + Brand Equity Tracker + VIC Concentration] H --> I[Re-forecast Regional Mix + Price + Wholesale Pruning] I --> A

30/60/90 Day Plan

Days 1–30: instrument the nine KPIs across the brand portfolio. Reconcile retail vs wholesale revenue across the ERP, store-level POS, and finance ledger — the three will not agree on day one, and that gap is the first finding. Pull a clean baseline of organic growth, gross margin, and retail share for the trailing 8 quarters by maison and by region.

Days 31–60: build the VIC and price-increase capture dashboards. Wire the VIC dashboard to the CRM (Salesforce or proprietary) on one side and the POS on the other, so top-client concentration is visible monthly, not annually. Audit the 2025-2026 price-increase round and quantify the actual capture rate by category and region — expect the gap between announced and realized to be 10-30 points wider than the brand team admits.

Days 61–90: present the wholesale pruning plan and the regional rebalance plan to the CFO and CEO. Identify the bottom-quartile wholesale doors by sell-through and brand fit, model the EBIT impact of closing them over 18 months, and pair it with a Greater China / Japan / Americas rebalance scenario.

Lock the monthly operating review template and the quarterly brand-equity tracker.

FAQ

Why is retail share such a heavily-weighted KPI in luxury? Because owned distribution is the only way to control pricing, visual merchandising, and the client experience. Every 500bps of retail share gain typically adds 150-200bps of EBIT margin and 50-100bps of gross margin because you capture the wholesale-to-retail spread and eliminate markdown leakage.

How do you benchmark gross margin across houses with different mixes? Decompose gross margin into category mix (leather vs ready-to-wear vs shoes vs hard luxury), channel mix (retail vs wholesale vs travel retail), and pure pricing power (price-increase capture rate). Two houses with identical 70% headline gross margin can have completely different underlying economics.

What is the right Greater China exposure in 2027? Roughly 20-28% of group revenue. Above 35% is concentration risk that will whip your P&L on the next consumer-cycle turn. Below 15% means you are missing the structural rebound Bain projects through 2027-2028. The houses that survived 2024-2025 best had ~25% China and ~9-10% Japan.

How fast can a luxury house actually recover from a creative reset? Eight to twelve quarters based on the Burberry, Bottega Veneta, and Saint Laurent cycles. The first 4 quarters see revenue decline as old codes are cleared. The next 4 see new collections re-build wholesale and retail orders.

Margin recovery follows revenue by another 4 quarters. Modeling a faster recovery is how analysts get burned.

Sources

LVMH Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton — Annual Report and Universal Registration Document 2025
Kering S.A. — Annual Report 2025 (Document d'Enregistrement Universel)
Hermès International — Annual Report and Universal Registration Document 2025
Compagnie Financière Richemont — Annual Report and Form 6-K (FY25 / FY26)
Bain & Company and Fondazione Altagamma — Luxury Goods Worldwide Market Study, 24th Edition (2025-2026)
Vogue Business — Vogue Business Index and Luxury Brand Coverage (2025-2026)
The Business of Fashion (BoF) — State of Fashion 2026 (with McKinsey)
Prada Group — Annual Report and Investor Presentations 2025
Moncler S.p.A. — Annual Report and Investor Presentations 2025
Brunello Cucinelli S.p.A. — Annual Report and Universal Registration Document 2025

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### Direct Answer

The nine KPIs that actually run a luxury fashion house in 2027 are: **Organic Revenue Growth %**, **Gross Margin %**, **EBIT (Recurring Operating) Margin %**, **Retail (DOS) Sales Share %**, **Wholesale Dependency %**, **Regional Mix (Greater China / Europe / Americas / Japan / RoW)**, **Leather Goods Share of Revenue %**, **Price-Increase Capture %**, and **Top-Client (VIC) Revenue Concentration %**. Together they answer the only three questions a luxury CFO and creative director actually fight about: are we still growing without discounting, are we controlling our distribution, and are we still desirable to the few thousand clients who write seven-figure checks.

> **TL;DR** — Luxury is a brand-equity business disguised as a fashion business. Organic growth below 3% means desirability is leaking; gross margin under 65% means the pricing power is gone; retail share under 70% means wholesale is dictating your image. Track the nine KPIs monthly, re-baseline the Greater China and VIC numbers every quarter, and run a price-increase capture review twice a year — that is the operating cadence LVMH, Hermès, and Richemont all converged on after the 2024-2025 normalization.

## Why Luxury Fashion Houses Work Differently

A luxury fashion house is not a retailer with a logo, even though it looks like one from the outside. Four mechanics make it its own category.

**Desirability-funds-pricing flywheel.** Every percentage point of brand desirability translates into roughly 50-150 basis points of pricing power per year. Hermès has compounded prices at ~7% annually for a decade and still has Birkin waitlists. Burberry and Gucci tried the same playbook during the 2021-2023 boom, lost the underlying desirability, and watched their organic growth turn negative in 2024-2025. The flywheel only spins one direction at a time.

**Quota-and-allocation economics.** Unlike apparel, the highest-margin luxury units are not sold on demand — they are allocated. A client buying a Birkin, a Cartier high jewelry piece, or a Patek Philippe Nautilus is selected. This makes the **top-client revenue share** a leading indicator of brand health. When the top 2% of clients drop from 40% to 30% of revenue, it almost always precedes a public deceleration by two quarters.

**Wholesale-is-distribution-is-image.** Every department store door and multi-brand boutique is a brand-equity decision, not a sales channel. LVMH Fashion & Leather Goods runs near 95% retail (direct-operated stores). Hermès is ~88%. Kering pushed Gucci toward 92% retail by closing 30%+ of wholesale doors in 2024-2025. The pattern is universal — the houses with the highest pricing power are the ones who own their distribution.

**Regional concentration as both engine and risk.** Greater China generated ~28-32% of personal luxury spend in 2024 before correcting to ~25% in 2025. A house with 40%+ China exposure (Burberry historically, Prada, Richemont jewelry) lives and dies on the Chinese consumer cycle. The houses that survived the 2024-2025 correction were the ones who had quietly rebalanced toward US and Japanese demand.

## The 9 KPIs, In Depth

**1. Organic Revenue Growth % (constant FX, like-for-like perimeter).** The cleanest top-line metric in luxury. Hermès posted +13% organic growth in 2024 and another high-single-digit number in 2025. LVMH Fashion & Leather Goods went from +14% in 2023 to -1% organic in 2025. Kering reported -10% organic in 2025. Bain projects 3-5% market growth in 2026. Anything sustainably above mid-single-digits in 2026-2027 means you are taking share.

**2. Gross Margin %.** The pricing-power metric. Hermès runs ~72% gross margin. LVMH Fashion & Leather Goods is ~68-70%. Kering ~73% headline (but inflated by mix). Healthy luxury is 65%+; under 60% means you are either overpaying for raw materials or under-pricing your product. Watch the year-over-year delta — a 200bps gross margin compression with flat revenue is almost always a markdown problem hiding in the cost line.

**3. EBIT (Recurring Operating) Margin %.** Hermès is the benchmark at ~40-41% — the highest in the industry. LVMH Fashion & Leather Goods historically ~35-39%, compressed to ~32% in 2025. Kering collapsed from ~28% in 2022 to mid-teens in 2025 as Gucci unwound. Brunello Cucinelli runs ~16-17%. Below 20% for a luxury house signals either creative reset costs or structural deleverage.

**4. Retail (DOS) Sales Share %.** Share of sales through directly operated stores plus owned e-commerce. LVMH Fashion & Leather Goods ~95%, Hermès ~88%, Prada Group ~91%, Burberry ~85%, Moncler ~85%, Brunello Cucinelli ~57% (the outlier that still leans on multi-brand). Best-in-class is 85%+. Every 500bps of retail share gain typically adds 150-200bps of group EBIT margin.

**5. Wholesale Dependency %.** The mirror of KPI 4 and a separate KPI because it captures the **concentration risk** inside wholesale — share of wholesale done with the top 5 department-store accounts (Nordstrom, Saks, Bergdorf, Harrods, Galeries Lafayette, El Corte Inglés, Isetan). If your top-5 wholesale customers are over 60% of wholesale revenue, a single account renegotiation moves your P&L.

**6. Regional Mix (Greater China / Europe / Americas / Japan / Rest of World).** Reported quarterly by every public house. The benchmark mix in 2026: ~30% Asia ex-Japan (of which 20-25 points is Greater China), ~25-28% Europe, ~25% Americas, ~7-9% Japan, balance RoW. Anything over 35% Greater China is concentration risk; under 15% means you are missing the rebound. Japan has structurally re-rated upward post-yen weakness — Hermès and LVMH both saw Japan move from ~7% to ~9-10% of group revenue.

**7. Leather Goods Share of Revenue %.** Leather goods carry the highest gross margins in fashion (often 75%+) and the lowest fashion risk. Louis Vuitton leather is estimated at 70%+ of brand revenue. Hermès leather goods & saddlery is ~43% of group. Gucci leather goods historically ~55%. A drift below 40% in a fashion-leather house typically means the ready-to-wear and shoes mix is bloating cost of goods.

**8. Price-Increase Capture %.** Of headline price increases pushed at the start of the season, the percentage that actually shows up in average selling price (ASP) by quarter-end. Hermès captures ~95%+ of announced price increases. LVMH historically ~85-90%. Gucci's capture rate collapsed to under 50% in 2024-2025 as discounting and outlet leakage eroded the headline number. Capture below 70% is the first quantitative sign that the brand has lost pricing power.

**9. Top-Client (VIC) Revenue Concentration %.** Share of revenue from the top 2% of clients (the "Very Important Clients"). Bain estimates "big spenders" went from 30% of the personal luxury market (€88B) in 2019 to 45-47% (~€165B) in 2024-2025 and have plateaued. House-specific data shows Hermès, Cartier, and Louis Vuitton run 35-45% top-2% concentration; Bottega Veneta and Saint Laurent ~25-30%; mass-luxury houses (Tapestry, Capri) under 15%. A drop of 500bps in top-client share is a 6-month leading indicator of revenue deceleration.

```mermaid
flowchart TD
    A[Brand Desirability Score] --> B{Pricing Power Intact?}
    B -->|Yes 95%+ Capture| C[Price Increase Takes Hold]
    B -->|No <70% Capture| D[Markdown + Outlet Leakage]
    C --> E[Gross Margin Expansion]
    D --> F[Gross Margin Compression]
    E --> G[Reinvest in Retail DOS Network]
    G --> H[Retail Share Climbs to 90%+]
    H --> I[VIC Allocation & Service Lifts]
    I --> J[Top-Client Share 40%+]
    J --> A
    F --> K[Wholesale Push to Move Inventory]
    K --> L[Image Dilution + VIC Defection]
    L --> M[Revenue Decel by Q+2]
    M --> A
```

## Real Operators

**LVMH** is the scale benchmark — €80.8B in 2025 revenue across 75 maisons, with Louis Vuitton and Dior the cash engines. **Hermès** is the profitability benchmark — €15.2B revenue with ~40% recurring operating margin and the highest gross margin in the industry. **Kering** (Gucci, Saint Laurent, Bottega Veneta, Balenciaga) is the cautionary tale of 2024-2025, posting -10% organic with Gucci in creative reset. **Richemont** (Cartier, Van Cleef & Arpels, Vacheron Constantin, Piaget) is the hard-luxury benchmark with jewelry maisons running ~30%+ EBIT margins. **Prada Group** (Prada, Miu Miu, Church's) became the unlikely momentum story — Miu Miu posted +90%+ organic growth in 2024 and high-double-digits in 2025. **Chanel** is private but disclosed $19.7B in 2023 revenue, the largest single-brand luxury house. **Burberry** is rebuilding after the Daniel Lee reset. **Moncler** runs ~28-30% EBIT margins on premium outerwear. **Brunello Cucinelli** is the slow-compounder — mid-teens organic growth, ~17% EBIT margin, the "quiet luxury" archetype. **Tapestry** (Coach, Kate Spade, Stuart Weitzman) is the accessible-luxury comp at ~$6.7B revenue. **Capri Holdings** (Versace, Jimmy Choo, Michael Kors) is the deal-saga, post the blocked Tapestry merger.

## Failure Modes

The four that quietly kill luxury houses. **(1) Wholesale-funded growth** — using department store and outlet expansion to hit short-term revenue targets, which dilutes brand equity and forces price compression within 18-24 months. **(2) Creative-director musical chairs** — replacing the head designer every 24-30 months destroys the visual codes clients pay for, and Gucci, Burberry, and Balmain all show the revenue scar tissue. **(3) Greater China over-indexing** — building a P&L that needs 35%+ China to make plan, then watching the consumer cycle take 600-1000bps off organic growth in a single quarter. **(4) VIC neglect** — under-investing in private salons, by-appointment events, and one-to-one client advisors, then watching top-2% client share decay 300-500bps a year while the brand quietly hollows out.

## Reporting Cadence

**Daily:** retail traffic, conversion, and DOS sell-through by region and category. **Weekly:** like-for-like growth, top-15 SKU sell-through, VIC appointments booked, e-commerce gross merchandise value. **Monthly:** organic growth by region, gross margin by category, retail vs wholesale mix, price-increase capture by season, top-client revenue concentration. **Quarterly:** full IFRS P&L, regional segment reporting for the half-year or annual call, brand-equity tracker results (BAV, Interbrand, Vogue Business Index), and re-baseline of the 12-month organic growth forecast.

```mermaid
flowchart TD
    A[Daily Retail Telemetry] --> B[Traffic + Conversion + DOS Sell-Through]
    B --> C[Weekly Brand Review]
    C --> D[LFL Growth + VIC Appts + Top-15 SKU]
    D --> E[Monthly Operating Review]
    E --> F[Organic by Region + GM by Category + Price Capture]
    F --> G[Quarterly Earnings + Board]
    G --> H[Full P&L + Brand Equity Tracker + VIC Concentration]
    H --> I[Re-forecast Regional Mix + Price + Wholesale Pruning]
    I --> A
```

## 30/60/90 Day Plan

**Days 1–30:** instrument the nine KPIs across the brand portfolio. Reconcile retail vs wholesale revenue across the ERP, store-level POS, and finance ledger — the three will not agree on day one, and that gap is the first finding. Pull a clean baseline of organic growth, gross margin, and retail share for the trailing 8 quarters by maison and by region.

**Days 31–60:** build the VIC and price-increase capture dashboards. Wire the VIC dashboard to the CRM (Salesforce or proprietary) on one side and the POS on the other, so top-client concentration is visible monthly, not annually. Audit the 2025-2026 price-increase round and quantify the actual capture rate by category and region — expect the gap between announced and realized to be 10-30 points wider than the brand team admits.

**Days 61–90:** present the wholesale pruning plan and the regional rebalance plan to the CFO and CEO. Identify the bottom-quartile wholesale doors by sell-through and brand fit, model the EBIT impact of closing them over 18 months, and pair it with a Greater China / Japan / Americas rebalance scenario. Lock the monthly operating review template and the quarterly brand-equity tracker.

## FAQ

**Why is retail share such a heavily-weighted KPI in luxury?** Because owned distribution is the only way to control pricing, visual merchandising, and the client experience. Every 500bps of retail share gain typically adds 150-200bps of EBIT margin and 50-100bps of gross margin because you capture the wholesale-to-retail spread and eliminate markdown leakage.

**How do you benchmark gross margin across houses with different mixes?** Decompose gross margin into category mix (leather vs ready-to-wear vs shoes vs hard luxury), channel mix (retail vs wholesale vs travel retail), and pure pricing power (price-increase capture rate). Two houses with identical 70% headline gross margin can have completely different underlying economics.

**What is the right Greater China exposure in 2027?** Roughly 20-28% of group revenue. Above 35% is concentration risk that will whip your P&L on the next consumer-cycle turn. Below 15% means you are missing the structural rebound Bain projects through 2027-2028. The houses that survived 2024-2025 best had ~25% China and ~9-10% Japan.

**How fast can a luxury house actually recover from a creative reset?** Eight to twelve quarters based on the Burberry, Bottega Veneta, and Saint Laurent cycles. The first 4 quarters see revenue decline as old codes are cleared. The next 4 see new collections re-build wholesale and retail orders. Margin recovery follows revenue by another 4 quarters. Modeling a faster recovery is how analysts get burned.

## Sources

- LVMH Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton — Annual Report and Universal Registration Document 2025
- Kering S.A. — Annual Report 2025 (Document d'Enregistrement Universel)
- Hermès International — Annual Report and Universal Registration Document 2025
- Compagnie Financière Richemont — Annual Report and Form 6-K (FY25 / FY26)
- Bain & Company and Fondazione Altagamma — Luxury Goods Worldwide Market Study, 24th Edition (2025-2026)
- Vogue Business — Vogue Business Index and Luxury Brand Coverage (2025-2026)
- The Business of Fashion (BoF) — State of Fashion 2026 (with McKinsey)
- Prada Group — Annual Report and Investor Presentations 2025
- Moncler S.p.A. — Annual Report and Investor Presentations 2025
- Brunello Cucinelli S.p.A. — Annual Report and Universal Registration Document 2025

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