How do college athletic departments make and spend money in 2027?
Published Jun 14, 2026 · Updated Jun 14, 2026
A college athletic department is a roughly $300-400 million enterprise at the top schools where one product — football — funds nearly everything else, and where rising costs and new revenue-sharing obligations are squeezing even the giants. In fiscal 2025, Ohio State generated $336.1 million in operating revenue against $320.4 million in expenses for a $15.7 million surplus, while Texas spent a record $375.9 million (up $50 million) against $352.5 million in revenue — a $23 million planned deficit tied to its SEC move and the loss of the Longhorn Network, leaving $192.2 million in athletics debt. The telling detail: at Texas, football was the only profitable program, earning roughly $107 million that subsidizes every other sport. Revenue flows from media rights, tickets, donations, and sponsorships; costs now include a new revenue-sharing line of about $21.3 million per school for 2026-27.
For operators, the athletic department is a vivid lesson in a loss-leader portfolio — one profitable product carrying many unprofitable ones — and in managing a P&L where costs rise faster than revenue.
1. One Product Funds the Portfolio
Football is the engine
At Texas, football earned about $107 million and was the only profitable program on campus. Every other sport runs at a loss, subsidized by football's surplus. The athletic department is a portfolio where one product generates nearly all the profit and funds the rest.
The loss-leader structure
This is a loss-leader model: football (and to a lesser extent men's basketball) is the profit center, while Olympic and non-revenue sports are cost centers kept for mission, compliance, and breadth. The whole enterprise depends on protecting the one profitable line.
2. The Revenue Streams
Where the money comes from
Top departments draw revenue from four main streams: media rights (the largest and most volatile), tickets, donations and fundraising (Texas surpassed $1 billion in fundraising), and sponsorships, plus NCAA and conference distributions. Ohio State's jump to $336.1 million shows how fast these can grow when media and conference money rise.
Media rights dominate and swing
Media rights are the biggest lever — and the riskiest. Texas reported about $21 million less in media revenue after losing the Longhorn Network in its SEC transition, a swing large enough to flip the department into deficit. When one stream this large moves, the whole P&L moves with it.
3. Rising Costs and the New Rev-Share Line
Costs climbing fast
Expenses are surging — Texas spent $375.9 million, a $50 million jump in one year. On top of facilities, salaries, and scholarships, departments now carry a new revenue-sharing obligation of about $21.3 million per school for 2026-27 (up to 22% of average power-conference revenue paid to athletes). The cost base structurally expanded.
The non-profit paradox
Athletic departments tend to spend everything they earn — the "non-profit paradox" where rising revenue funds rising costs rather than surplus. Texas's debt of $192.2 million shows departments will even borrow to keep spending on facilities and rosters, betting future revenue covers it.
4. The RevOps and Finance Lessons
Protect the product that funds everything
The clearest lesson is that a loss-leader portfolio lives or dies by its one profitable product. RevOps and finance teams running a portfolio where one product, segment, or customer cohort generates most of the profit must protect that engine above all — its health determines whether the whole enterprise survives. Concentration of profit is concentration of risk.
Watch the volatile dominant revenue line
Media rights dominate and swing the P&L — a single contract change flipped Texas into deficit. Operators with one outsized revenue stream should stress-test what happens when it moves, and avoid building a cost base that only works if the dominant line keeps rising. The Texas deficit was planned precisely because they modeled the media swing.
Discipline costs as revenue rises
The non-profit paradox — spending everything you earn — is a warning. Rising revenue invites rising costs and even debt, leaving no cushion when a revenue line wobbles. RevOps and finance should hold the line on cost discipline as revenue grows, banking surplus and limiting debt so a downturn does not become a crisis.
5. What to Watch
The expanded College Football Playoff TV contract is expected to raise revenues over the next several years, easing some pressure — but the new revenue-sharing cost and rising salaries push the other way. The questions for 2027 are how departments fund the $21.3 million rev-share line on top of climbing expenses, whether non-revenue sports survive the squeeze, and how much debt programs take on chasing competitiveness. The durable lessons stand: protect the product that funds the portfolio, stress-test the volatile dominant revenue line, and hold cost discipline as revenue grows.
The New Revenue Frontier: Direct Athlete Compensation and NIL Collectives
By 2027, the most transformative change to athletic department finances isn’t ticket sales or TV deals—it’s the formal integration of athlete compensation into the university budget. Following the 2024 House v. NCAA settlement, schools in the Power 4 conferences (SEC, Big Ten, ACC, Big 12) are now required to share roughly 22% of their average media rights and ticket revenue with athletes, translating to $20–23 million per school annually for the 2026-27 academic year. This isn’t optional; it’s a legal obligation that has reshaped the expense side of every major department’s P&L.
To fund this, athletic departments have had to make hard choices. Many are now operating with $5–15 million in annual structural deficits, using university loans, reserve funds, or future media rights advances to cover the gap. Meanwhile, NIL collectives—once separate, donor-funded entities—are increasingly being brought in-house. Schools like Ohio State and Georgia now employ full-time NIL coordinators who work alongside the compliance office to ensure collective payments count toward the revenue-sharing cap. The result: a department that in 2020 might have spent $0 on direct athlete payments now allocates $25–30 million annually between revenue-sharing and collective support, making it the second-largest expense category after coaching salaries.
For smaller programs in the Group of Five or FCS, this new line item is existential. Schools like Boise State or Appalachian State, with total athletic budgets of $40–60 million, cannot absorb a $20 million revenue-sharing mandate. Instead, they rely on waivers or reduced shares, but the gap between haves and have-nots has widened dramatically. The financial floor for competing at the FBS level has effectively doubled in three years.
The Spending Side: Where the $300–400 Million Goes
While revenue stories dominate headlines, the expense side reveals the true financial complexity of modern athletic departments. In 2027, the largest single cost is coaching and staff compensation, which consumes 35–45% of total expenses at Power 4 schools. A top football head coach now earns $10–12 million annually (including bonuses and buyout payments), while a full staff of 10-12 assistant coaches, analysts, and support personnel adds another $8–12 million. Basketball is similarly top-heavy: a blue-blood program might pay its head coach $5–7 million and a staff of 5-7 assistants $3–5 million.
The second-largest expense is facilities and debt service. Texas’s $192 million athletics debt, mentioned earlier, is not unusual. Most Power 4 schools carry $100–250 million in long-term debt for stadium renovations, practice facilities, and arenas. Annual debt payments (principal and interest) run $10–20 million per year, often eating up 10-15% of total revenue. These are fixed costs that cannot be cut, even if attendance dips.
Third is operational and travel costs, which have ballooned to $15–25 million annually for a typical Power 4 program. Conference realignment has stretched travel distances—a Big Ten school like UCLA now flies to Rutgers, a 2,500-mile trip, for conference games. Charter flights for football alone cost $1–2 million per season, while basketball, soccer, and other sports add millions more. Meals, equipment, medical care, and academic support for 500+ athletes add another $5–10 million.
Finally, administrative overhead—compliance, marketing, ticket office, development—accounts for 10–15% of spending, or $30–50 million at the largest schools. The new revenue-sharing compliance burden has added 3-5 full-time positions at most departments, costing an additional $500,000–1 million annually.
The Bottom Line: A Two-Tier System Hardens
The financial data from 2025-2027 makes one trend unmistakable: college athletics is splitting into two distinct economic tiers. At the top, the Power 4 “haves” (roughly 40-50 schools) operate with budgets of $250–400 million, enjoy $50–100 million in annual media rights revenue, and can absorb the new $20 million athlete compensation line while still breaking even or running modest deficits. These schools are essentially minor-league professional operations, with CFOs, investment portfolios, and multi-year strategic plans.
Below them, the Group of Five, FCS, and non-football schools (roughly 300+ institutions) operate on $15–60 million budgets, often rely on student fees for 30–50% of revenue, and face existential pressure from the new compensation mandates. Many have cut non-revenue sports (wrestling, men’s swimming, tennis) to redirect funds toward football and basketball. The NCAA’s own data shows that only 25-30 FBS programs are fully self-sustaining (revenue > expenses without subsidies); the rest depend on university general funds, student fees, or state appropriations.
For athletic directors in 2027, the job is no longer about winning games alone—it’s about managing a $300 million enterprise with razor-thin margins, rising labor costs, and a regulatory environment that changes every legislative session. The schools that survive this decade will be those that treat their athletic department like a business: disciplined on costs, aggressive on revenue diversification, and clear-eyed about which sports actually pay the bills.
FAQ
How much revenue do top college athletic departments generate? At elite public universities, annual operating revenue typically falls between $300 million and $400 million. Ohio State reported about $336 million in fiscal 2025, while Texas generated roughly $352 million. These figures vary widely by conference and football program success.
What is the biggest source of money for athletic departments? Media rights deals are the dominant revenue driver, often exceeding $100 million annually for Power Five schools. Ticket sales, donations, and sponsorships add tens of millions more, but football broadcast contracts alone can account for over half of total revenue.
Why do most athletic departments run deficits or break even? Only football consistently turns a profit, often subsidizing all other sports. At Texas, football earned roughly $107 million while every other program lost money. Rising costs for coaching salaries, facilities, and new athlete revenue-sharing obligations (around $21.3 million per school in 2026-27) push expenses higher than revenue for many departments.
How much do schools spend on coaching salaries and facilities? Coaching compensation can exceed $10 million annually for top football and basketball head coaches, with entire staff budgets often over $30 million. Facility upgrades and debt service add another $20 million to $50 million yearly for large programs, depending on stadium renovations or new construction.
What is the new athlete revenue-sharing cost in 2027? Under recent NCAA settlement terms, schools in the Power Five conferences are expected to share roughly $21.3 million per year with athletes starting in 2026-27. This covers direct payments for name, image, and likeness (NIL) and other compensation, adding a significant new expense line to department budgets.
Can smaller schools compete with these financial giants? Most non-Power Five programs operate on budgets of $30 million to $80 million, far below the top tier. They rely heavily on student fees, state subsidies, and smaller media deals, making it nearly impossible to match the spending or revenue of schools like Ohio State or Texas.
Bottom Line
A top college athletic department is a $300-376 million enterprise where football funds nearly everything — at Texas, football's $107 million profit subsidizes a portfolio that otherwise loses money, even as the department ran a planned $23 million deficit on a media swing and carries $192.2 million in debt. Ohio State's $15.7 million surplus shows the upside when media and conference money rise. For operators, the lessons are exact: protect the product that funds the portfolio, stress-test the volatile dominant revenue line, and hold cost discipline as revenue grows.
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Sources
- AOL — Ohio State exceeds $300 million in athletics revenue for first time
- Sportico — Texas sets new college sports spending mark with $376M spree
- Yahoo Sports — Texas athletic department reports $23 million loss in 2025 from SEC move
- ESPN — College athletics revenues and expenses 2026
- Athletic Director U — Rethinking rising expenses and the non-profit paradox
- College Sports Commission — Revenue sharing
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*College athletic department review — athletic department revenue reviews, rating, college sports finance review 2027, and a review of the football loss-leader model, media-rights volatility, and revenue sharing for operators.*










