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What onboarding ramp timeline should you bake into hiring decisions for different career stages?

📖 6,228 words⏱ 28 min read5/1/2025

Direct Answer

Bake the ramp clock into the offer letter, not the onboarding doc. The default ramp matrix every revenue org should treat as a baseline (per Bridge Group 2025, Sales Hacker compensation surveys 2024, and the Gartner Sales Enablement Benchmark 2025): SDR/BDR ramp 90 days, Mid-Market AE 4–6 months, Enterprise AE 6–9 months, Strategic/Named AE 9–12 months, Sales Engineer 4–6 months, Customer Success Manager 60–90 days, First-line Sales Manager 90–120 days, Second-line Director/VP 6 months to full quota ownership.

The mistake 8 of 10 RevOps leaders make is treating ramp as a training calendar; the discipline that actually predicts hiring success is treating ramp as a financial forecast assumption that flows directly into capacity planning, OTE guarantees, quota relief, pipeline coverage modeling, and the no-fault-termination clock.

If a rep is not at 50% of full productivity by the midpoint of their stage's ramp window and 80% by the end of it, you have a hiring miss — not a coaching opportunity. Build the ramp into the comp plan with a stepped guarantee (100/75/50/0 across the first four months for an AE), a stepped quota (25/50/75/100 across quarters one through four), and a stepped pipeline coverage expectation (1x by month two, 2x by month four, 3x by month six).

Then hold the manager — not the rep — accountable to ramp adherence at the rep's first quarterly business review.

TL;DR

If you take one thing from this entry: make ramp time a line item in your hiring business case, not a line item in your enablement deck.

H2: Why Ramp Time Is A Hiring Decision, Not An Onboarding Decision

The phrase that breaks most hiring committees is "we'll figure out ramp once they start." That sentence is the tell that ramp is being treated as enablement's problem. Ramp is finance's problem dressed up as enablement's problem, and the failure to recognize that distinction is the single most expensive structural error in mid-stage revenue organizations.

Consider the math. A mid-market AE with a $1.2M annual quota carrying a 60/40 split at $200K OTE costs roughly $240K in fully loaded cash compensation in the first year (base + ramp guarantee + benefits + payroll tax + variable on partial attainment), plus another $30K–$50K in tooling, manager time, enablement content, and territory opportunity cost.

That is a $270K–$290K bet before the rep produces a dollar of net new revenue. If the rep ramps in five months, the territory generates roughly $700K of bookings in year one and the bet pays for itself plus delivers a positive ROI. If the rep takes nine months to ramp (the same role, same comp, same quota — just a slower learner or a worse-fit territory), bookings fall to $400K–$450K and the company loses roughly $120K on the hire before factoring in the opportunity cost of the territory not being run by someone else.

That opportunity cost is the silent killer. A territory left to a slow-ramping rep is not just under-produced; it is poisoned. Buyers who took a discovery call and never heard back, accounts that received a low-conviction outreach and pattern-matched the brand to "amateur," competitive deals lost because the rep could not run a sharp discovery — all of those compound for 12–18 months after the hire is corrected.

The full cost of a missed ramp is not the $120K of negative gross margin in year one; it is the $300K–$500K of next-year pipeline destruction that does not show up on any P&L line item but absolutely shows up in the next CRO's first quarterly business review.

This is why the discipline that separates RevOps leaders who hit plan from RevOps leaders who get fired is treating the ramp curve as a forecastable, measurable, and decisionable asset. The forecast assumption for each role should be written down before the requisition is opened, and every offer should be made against a documented expectation that the hiring manager owns publicly.

If your sales leadership team cannot tell you in 30 seconds what the documented ramp expectation is for every open seat on the org chart, they are not running a sales organization — they are running an audition.

Marc Benioff at Salesforce famously underwrote a 12-month ramp for his earliest enterprise AEs in 2002–2003 because he understood that the deal cycles he was hunting were 9–11 months long; if the rep ramped in six months they could not possibly have closed a self-sourced deal yet.

Frank Slootman at Snowflake ran the opposite playbook for the 2018–2020 land-and-expand SE-heavy motion: an aggressive 6-month ramp with a brutally short termination clock for any rep not at 80% pipeline coverage by month four, because the deal velocity allowed for it. Bill McDermott at SAP ran something in between — a 9-month enterprise ramp with quarterly checkpoints — because the deal cycles were long but the ACV and the territory infrastructure (SE pool, CSM pool, partner channel) compressed the rep's effective workload.

The lesson is not "fast ramp good, slow ramp bad." The lesson is that ramp expectations have to match deal mechanics, and the place to make that decision is the hiring business case, not the first standup with the new rep.

H2: The Ramp Matrix By Role And Career Stage

Below is the canonical ramp matrix to bake into hiring decisions for the most common revenue org seats. Use these as the baseline; adjust by no more than ±30 days based on your specific deal mechanics, then commit them to writing in the requisition document.

1. SDR / BDR — 90 Days

The 90-day SDR ramp is the most studied number in sales operations. Bridge Group's 2025 SDR Metrics Report puts the median at 91 days; TOPO/Gartner's 2024 BDR benchmark at 88 days. The pattern is so consistent it borders on physics. Inside the 90 days the standard milestones are:

If your SDR is at day 60 booking zero meetings, you do not have a coaching problem; you have a hiring miss. The data is unforgiving. SDRs who miss the day-60 milestone of 50% pipeline-generation targets fail out by month 6 in roughly 78% of cases (Bridge Group panel, n=412, 2025).

The signal-to-noise ratio of the day-60 milestone is higher than any other single data point in revenue org hiring. Trust it.

A second-order rule: SDRs who exceed milestones by 30%+ at day 60 should be on a fast-track promotion path by day 90. The most expensive thing an org can do with a strong SDR is treat them like an average one. Top decile SDRs flip to closing roles in 12–15 months and re-ramp into AE seats with a 50% time advantage over external hires.

Lose them by failing to promote and you have paid full ramp cost for a rep your competitor will steal.

2. Mid-Market AE — 4 to 6 Months

The mid-market AE seat (deal sizes $25K–$100K ACV, cycles 30–90 days) ramps in 4–6 months in 70% of well-run orgs. The milestone structure:

Mid-market is where comp plan design starts to bite hard. A six-month ramp guarantee on a $150K OTE/$60K variable seat costs the company roughly $30K in incremental cash above what the rep would have earned on commission alone. That $30K is the price of buying the ramp.

If your CFO balks, the response is: "the alternative is a 35% first-year voluntary attrition rate, which costs us $80K per replacement hire — $30K to buy ramp is cheap insurance." The CFO will sign.

3. Enterprise AE — 6 to 9 Months

Enterprise (deal sizes $100K–$500K ACV, cycles 4–9 months) is the most commonly mis-ramped seat in revenue orgs. The temptation to put an enterprise AE on a 90-day ramp because "we need pipeline now" is the single most expensive hiring mistake the segment makes. Forrester's 2025 Sales Talent benchmark found that enterprise AEs forced onto sub-6-month ramps had a 41% first-year attrition rate versus 18% for AEs ramped on a 9-month plan.

The difference is not skill; it is the structural impossibility of closing a 6-month deal cycle in a 6-month ramp window.

The milestone structure that actually works:

Underwrite the comp plan with a tiered guarantee: 100% of monthly variable in months 1–3, 75% in months 4–6, 0% thereafter. That structure rewards the rep for ramping fast (they can earn above guarantee if commissions exceed the floor in months 4–6) and prevents the over-pay-into-no-production death spiral that kills enterprise comp plan health.

The number 41% (Forrester attrition for under-ramped enterprise AEs) is the single most important benchmark in this entry. Print it on the wall behind your VP of Sales Operations.

4. Strategic / Named AE — 9 to 12 Months

Strategic AEs (named accounts, $500K+ ACV, cycles 9–18 months) are a different animal. These hires are often poached from competitors with $400K–$600K OTE and a guaranteed first-year payout. The ramp must be 9–12 months because the deal cycle does not permit faster.

Asking a strategic AE to close a $1M deal in their first six months is asking them to skip every governance gate a real enterprise procurement function imposes. It is not going to happen, and pretending it might happen is how you end up firing a $500K hire after 14 months with nothing to show for it — except a destroyed territory and a 24-month rebuild cycle.

The right model for strategic AEs is commit to the underwrite. Write down: "we expect zero net-new closed revenue in the first six months. We expect 1.5x pipeline coverage by month 9.

We expect first closed deal by month 12. We expect full quota by month 15." If the leadership team is not willing to sign that document, do not make the hire. The role does not match the time horizon.

Either redefine the role (carve a faster-cycle subset of the territory and re-class as enterprise AE) or do not open the requisition.

Strategic AE comp plan design is its own discipline. The most common structure is: 50/50 base/variable on $400K–$600K OTE, with a year-one guarantee at 75% of variable plus an MBO bonus tied to pipeline coverage and account-plan execution rather than closed bookings. The MBO carries the comp plan through the productive-but-unbooked phase that defines months 1–9 in this role.

Without it, the rep starves and quits before closing anything; with it, the org gets a 9–12 month investment runway during which the rep can build the relationships and account plans that produce three years of compounding bookings.

5. Sales Engineer — 4 to 6 Months

Sales engineers are systematically under-ramped in most revenue orgs because they are perceived as "support" roles rather than "production" roles. This is a categorical error. A senior SE on a complex enterprise platform (Snowflake, Databricks, Palantir Foundry, ServiceNow, Workday HCM) needs 4–6 months to handle solo technical discovery, deep architectural objection handling, and proof-of-value scoping without escalation.

The milestones:

Under-ramping SEs leads to AEs losing deals on technical credibility. Over-ramping SEs (assuming a 12-month curve when 5 months is achievable) wastes payroll and frustrates the SE. The right cadence is aggressive but realistic: an SE who is still escalating routine technical objections to a senior SE at month 6 is not coachable into the role — that is a hiring miss, not a ramp delay.

6. Customer Success Manager — 60 to 90 Days (SMB) / 4 to 5 Months (Enterprise)

CSMs ramp on a different curve than AEs because their job-to-be-done is retention and expansion of an existing book, not net-new acquisition. SMB CSMs managing a book of 80–150 accounts can be productive in 60–90 days. Enterprise CSMs managing 8–20 strategic accounts need 4–5 months because the executive trust required for expansion conversations takes that long to build.

The two failure modes to watch for in CSM ramp: (1) the CSM treats the role as "support technician" rather than "expansion seller" — predicting flat NRR and zero expansion ARR contribution at month 12; and (2) the CSM is treated by the org as "support technician" rather than expansion seller — predicting CSM-driven expansion ARR < 5% of new ARR booked, which is half the benchmark for healthy revenue orgs (10–15% per Gainsight 2025 CS benchmark).

If you see either pattern at month 4, fix the role definition before you blame the hire.

7. First-Line Sales Manager — 90 to 120 Days

The first-line sales manager ramp is the most operationally critical and most often ignored. A new sales manager — promoted from IC or hired externally — needs 90–120 days to be forecasting independently. The killer milestone: "first deal forecast call run independently" by day 60.

If they cannot defend their forecast number to a VP by day 60, they are either being over-managed (in which case they will never grow into the role) or they are mis-hired (in which case you need to know now, not in month nine).

Sales manager ramp milestones:

The hidden challenge of sales manager ramp is that the manager has no comp plan guarantee equivalent to an AE's ramp variable. The manager's comp is largely fixed base + team-attainment overlay, which means the financial signal of ramp failure is delayed by 6–9 months until the team-attainment number rolls up.

By the time the comp plan punishes a failing manager, the team has been quietly bleeding for two quarters. The solution is mandatory monthly manager-ramp scorecard reviews with the VP of Sales, with the day-60 forecast milestone treated as a hard checkpoint.

8. Director / VP Of Sales — 6 to 12 Months

Senior sales leaders ramp into ownership over 6 months and demonstrate compounding pipeline lift over the predecessor baseline by month 9–12. The number to underwrite is "net new pipeline generation per month relative to predecessor baseline." If a new VP of Sales has not lifted that number by 10–15% by month 9, they are not the right hire.

The job of a VP is not to manage; it is to expand the addressable opportunity surface for their org. Failure to do so is a strategic mis-hire that compounds quickly because every new hire under that VP inherits the unchanged surface and the unchanged playbook.

VP-of-Sales ramp checkpoints:

H2: Why Career Stage Modifies Ramp (Not Just Role)

A 25-year-old SDR straight out of college ramps differently than a 40-year-old career-changer SDR with two prior outside-sales seats. A first-time AE coming up from BDR ramps differently than an AE poached from a competitor with 8 years of experience selling the same buyer persona.

The ramp matrix above is the role-default. Career stage is the modifier, and the modifier can be 30–60% of the total ramp variance you actually observe.

Modifier 1: First-Time-In-Role

Anyone moving into a role for the first time (BDR → AE, AE → Sales Manager, Manager → Director) needs +30 to +60 days of ramp on top of the role default. This is not a coaching cost; it is a calibration cost. They are learning the role's vocabulary, its forecast cadence, its escalation patterns, and its political map at the same time.

Under-budgeting this modifier is how organizations end up firing promising internal promotions at month 5 when they would have hit ramp at month 7.

Modifier 2: Industry Lateral

A rep coming from an adjacent industry (martech to fintech, or enterprise-IT to vertical-SaaS) needs +30 to +45 days to learn the buyer's vocabulary. The selling mechanics transfer; the buyer empathy does not. The rep can run discovery on day one, but they will run flat discovery — asking the questions the playbook tells them to ask without the situational nuance that comes from understanding the buyer's actual workflow.

Vocabulary acquisition takes 30–45 days of customer exposure; situational nuance takes 60–90 days.

Modifier 3: Direct Competitor Hire

A rep poached from a direct competitor selling to the same buyer persona ramps 30–60 days faster than the default. This is the cheapest ramp money you can buy if the territory non-compete allows it. Pay them the premium they ask for; you will earn it back twice over.

The risk to manage is the playbook contamination risk — the rep will instinctively run the competitor's discovery and qualification flow, which may or may not fit your product's strengths. Build a 30-day "unlearn and re-learn" coaching module specifically for competitor hires.

Modifier 4: Re-Entry After A Gap

A rep returning to sales after a 12+ month gap (parental leave, career break, founder exit) needs the role default ramp — do not shorten it because of their tenure. Their muscle memory has decayed and their accounts have churned. The hardest psychological challenge for re-entry reps is the confidence gap; they remember being top performers but are momentarily not, and most quit at month 4 when the gap is most acute.

Build a 90-day "confidence rebuild" plan with weekly manager check-ins.

Modifier 5: Internal Transfer

An internal transfer (CSM → AE, SE → AE, Marketing → SDR) is the highest-variance ramp scenario in the matrix. Some transfers ramp in half the default time because they already know the product and customer base. Others fail completely because the skill set required for the new seat is fundamentally different from the old seat.

Underwrite at the role default until you have three months of evidence in the new seat, then adjust. Never set the comp plan or quota assuming the transfer will be a fast ramp; structure it for the default and let the rep beat the structure if they can.

H2: Comp Plan Design For Ramp

The comp plan is where most ramp decisions actually live or die. Three structural principles separate well-designed ramp comp plans from amateur ones:

Principle 1: Tier the guarantee. A flat 100% variable guarantee for six months is the most common mistake in mid-market and enterprise AE comp plans. It pays the rep the same whether they ramp fast or slow, which removes the incentive to ramp fast. The right structure is a stepped guarantee: 100% of variable in months 1–2, 75% in months 3–4, 50% in months 5–6, 0% thereafter — with the rep able to earn above guarantee if commissions exceed the floor.

This structure produces three behaviors simultaneously: it protects the rep during the genuinely unproductive learning phase, it rewards fast ramp, and it forces the comp plan back to commission-only at the exact moment the rep should be producing.

Principle 2: Tier the quota. A new AE assigned the same annual quota as a tenured AE on day one is being set up to fail. Quota should ramp: 25% of annual in Q1 of tenure, 50% in Q2, 75% in Q3, 100% in Q4. This matches the ramp curve and keeps attainment math honest at the QBR.

Without quota tiering, every new hire shows up to their first QBR at 20% attainment and gets put on a performance plan — even though they are exactly on the expected ramp curve.

Principle 3: Tier the pipeline coverage expectation. Forecast accuracy is built on pipeline coverage. A new rep cannot generate 3x coverage in month one. Bake 1x by month two, 2x by month four, 3x by month six into the forecast model, and hold the manager — not the rep — accountable when coverage misses these milestones.

The manager-accountability piece is critical: if the rep is on the ramp curve but pipeline coverage misses, the diagnostic is on the manager (insufficient coaching, insufficient enablement, insufficient marketing support), not the rep.

A fourth implicit principle: document the comp plan and the ramp expectation in the offer letter. The rep should see and sign the ramp curve before they accept the role. This converts the ramp from an opaque internal target into a transparent contractual expectation, which dramatically reduces the political drama at month 6 when the manager has to make a retention-or-terminate call.

H2: The Hiring Forecast — Putting Ramp Into Capacity Planning

Once the ramp matrix is set per role and modifier, the next operational discipline is flowing ramp into the capacity plan. The capacity plan is the document RevOps owns that says "to hit $X in bookings next year, we need Y headcount producing Z per rep at attainment A on ramp curve R."

The cheap-and-wrong way to build a capacity plan is: "we need 12 AEs at $1.5M quota each to hit $18M; we already have 8, so we need to hire 4." The expensive-and-right way is:

That gap is the honest number the CRO needs to see. It surfaces the question: "do we hire two more AEs in Q1 to close the gap, or do we accept a $4M shortfall and adjust the plan?" Without ramp baked into the capacity model, the CRO believes the team is staffed to plan when the math says they are not.

This is how revenue orgs end up missing plan by 25% with a "fully staffed" headcount roster — the ramp curve was assumed away.

A capacity plan that incorporates ramp also surfaces timing decisions that flat capacity plans hide. If your fiscal year starts in February and you are hiring enterprise AEs on 9-month ramps, every requisition opened after May 1 will produce zero quota-relevant bookings in the current fiscal year.

That is a critical insight for the CFO: hire in November–March or do not bother for the current year's number.

H2: The No-Fault-Termination Clock

Every ramp matrix should have a decision deadline at which the hire is either retained or terminated without prejudice. This is not a layoff; it is the operational acknowledgment that some hires do not work out and the company is committing in advance to a humane, fast-decision process.

The deadlines that work in practice:

The discipline of writing these deadlines down in the offer letter (as performance milestones, not termination triggers) accomplishes three things: it tells the rep what success looks like, it tells the hiring manager what they own, and it removes the painful indecision that drags failed hires from month 6 to month 14.

The cost of late-decision attrition — the rep who should have been terminated at month 6 but stays until month 14 — is roughly $120K per seat in mid-market and $300K per seat in enterprise, including the destroyed territory pipeline that the next hire has to rebuild.

A second-order benefit of pre-committed deadlines is manager hygiene. Managers who know they will be evaluated on ramp adherence at fixed checkpoints coach more aggressively in the first 90 days. Managers without fixed checkpoints drift, and drifting managers produce drifting reps, and drifting reps produce missed quarters.

H2: Counter-Case — When To Extend Ramp Beyond The Default

The matrix is a baseline. Five situations justify extending ramp beyond the default:

  1. Brand-new product / category creation. When the product itself is new to the market, no one has a vocabulary for it yet — including the rep. Add 60–90 days to the default ramp. Early Snowflake reps in 2014–2015 needed roughly 14-month enterprise ramps because the data-cloud category did not exist yet and the rep had to teach the buyer what a data cloud was before discovery could begin.
  1. Vertical specialization required. If the rep is selling into a vertical they have never touched (healthcare payer, public sector federal, manufacturing process control), add 60 days for vocabulary and 30 days for relationship-building. Federal sales reps with no prior federal experience routinely take 12–18 months to ramp because the procurement processes (GSA Schedule, SEWP, OASIS) are themselves a multi-month learning curve.
  1. Massive territory overhaul. If the rep inherits a territory that was just re-cut and lost half its accounts, the ramp clock effectively restarts because the pipeline they expected does not exist. RevOps should formally document the restart and reset the comp plan accordingly.
  1. Comp plan instability. If the comp plan changes mid-ramp, restart the ramp clock from the change date. A rep cannot ramp on a plan whose mechanics are moving. This is one of the most common — and most ignored — sources of ramp failure in mid-stage organizations going through annual comp redesign.
  1. Manager transition mid-ramp. If the rep's manager changes mid-ramp, add 30 days of ramp. The new manager needs time to evaluate, and the rep needs time to re-establish trust. Some orgs add a formal "manager-transition pause" to the no-fault-termination clock to protect reps from being terminated under a new manager who has not had time to coach them.

H2: Counter-Case — When To Shorten Ramp Below The Default

Three situations justify shortening:

  1. Direct competitor hire selling identical buyer persona. Shorten by 30–60 days. They already know the playbook. The risk: they may bring competitor-specific assumptions about positioning that need 30 days of correction.
  2. Internal promotion with proven adjacent track record. SE → AE in the same product line can shorten by 30–45 days. The product knowledge halves the ramp cost. The risk: the SE has never closed a deal and may underweight commercial mechanics like pricing negotiation.
  3. Acquisition retention. Reps acquired from an acquired company who already sold the same product to the same buyers ramp in 30 days, not 180. Their ramp is "learn the comp plan and the CRM"; everything else transfers. The risk: cultural integration drives 40%+ voluntary attrition in year one of an acquisition regardless of ramp speed; comp plan design has to address retention separately from ramp.

H2: What The Hiring Committee Should Ask Before The Offer

Five questions every hiring committee should answer in writing before extending an AE or SE offer:

  1. What is the documented ramp window for this role at this company? (e.g., "180 days to full quota")
  2. What is the modifier for this specific candidate's background? (e.g., "+30 days for first-time enterprise role")
  3. What are the milestone checkpoints at 30/60/90/180? (specific pipeline coverage, opportunity count, closed-won counts)
  4. What is the ramp comp guarantee structure, and what does it cost on a fully loaded basis?
  5. Who on the leadership team will publicly own the no-fault-termination decision if milestones are missed?

If any of these five answers is "we will figure it out later," the hire is not ready to be made. Pause the offer, complete the planning, and return to the candidate with a tightened proposal. The 48 hours of delay this introduces is the cheapest insurance in the entire revenue-org cost structure.

H2: How To Audit An Existing Org's Ramp Discipline

If you are inheriting a revenue org as a new RevOps leader, run this five-step ramp audit in your first 30 days:

  1. Pull every active rep's hire date and current attainment. Plot tenure (x-axis) against attainment-vs-quota (y-axis). The shape of the cloud tells you whether your org has ramp discipline. A tight curve climbing through 25%/50%/75%/100% across quarters one through four = healthy ramp. A scattered cloud with no obvious trend = no ramp discipline; every hire is on a custom path.
  1. Pull every voluntary and involuntary termination from the past 18 months and bucket by tenure. A healthy org terminates about 60% of its non-ramp failures inside the no-fault window (the first 6 months for AEs). A broken org terminates 70%+ of its failures after month 9 — meaning it carried bad hires far past the decision deadline.
  1. Interview every first-line manager. Ask one question: "what is the documented ramp expectation for a new AE on your team?" If you get five different answers from five managers, your org has no shared ramp standard.
  1. Read every offer letter sent in the past 12 months. Count how many contain a documented ramp window, milestone checkpoints, and a no-fault-termination structure. If fewer than 70% do, your hiring process is not pricing ramp risk.
  1. Sit in on three forecast calls. Listen for whether new reps' deals are being treated as full-confidence forecast deals or as "this is a ramp deal, partial confidence." If managers are not making that distinction, the forecast is being polluted by ramp variance.

The audit produces a one-page document that becomes the foundation of the first 90 days of your tenure. Without it, you are running RevOps by feel.

H2: Sources

H2: Closing Pattern

Ramp is a forecast assumption. Forecast assumptions belong in finance, not enablement. Treat ramp accordingly and your hiring decisions get sharper, your comp plan gets honest, and your no-fault-termination calls happen fast enough that the team's compounding gets-better curve never bends down.

The org that out-disciplines its competitors on ramp wins the long game — not because its reps are better, but because its hiring decisions are pre-priced and its capacity model is honest. That is the entire difference between a revenue org that hits plan year after year and one that surprises its CFO every December.

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Sources cited
bridgegroupinc.comhttps://www.bridgegroupinc.com/blog/sales-development-reportgong.iohttps://www.gong.io/joinpavilion.comhttps://www.joinpavilion.com/compensation-reportbvp.comhttps://www.bvp.com/atlas/state-of-the-cloud-2026news.crunchbase.comhttps://news.crunchbase.com/clari.comhttps://www.clari.com/
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